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In his 2008 Report, the UN Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights John Ruggie recognized the growing imbalance between the rights of 
transnational corporations and the needs of host states. Pointing to the high number of 
BITs which are designed to provide large protection to foreign investors, he concluded 
that host states might find it more difficult to strengthen the social, environmental or 
human rights standards without fear of investors’ challenges.
1
 Furthermore, their 
position is even more complicated when it comes to the defence against violations of 
domestic laws and human rights abuses by foreign investors. This asymmetry has 
provoked an intensive debate about the possible ways of how to enforce investors’ 
compliance in investment arbitration.
2
  
One of the often cited mechanisms which could help to redress these 
deficiencies is the filing of counterclaims by host states in arbitral proceedings. Unlike 
proposals of progressive reforms, counterclaims have been long available to the parties 
in investment arbitration, yet they were brought mainly before contract-based tribunals. 
Only in 2001 did a treaty-based tribunal deal with a counterclaim filed by a host state 
for the first time.
3
 Since then, counterclaims were heard in another more than 20 cases, 
receiving increasing attention of academics and practitioners.
4
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Despite their promising role in enforcing investors’ compliance with human 
rights standards, counterclaims have, surprisingly, addressed this issue only in the 
recent dispute between the Spanish investor Urbaser and Argentina.
5
 This paper, 
therefore, poses a question whether counterclaims can indeed live up to the expectations 
and allow host states to hold foreign investors accountable for human rights violations 
in investment arbitration. When bringing counterclaims before an arbitral tribunal, host 
states as respondents face numerous obstacles created by the wording of IIAs which 
eventually makes counterclaims often fall out of the tribunal’s jurisdiction or fail in the 
stage of merits. Through the analysis of existing case law and the language of IIAs, this 
paper examines individual conditions upon which counterclaims can be successfully 
heard in investment arbitration. 
 
  
                                                 
5
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1.1 Research questions 
Despite the growing popularity of investment arbitration for the settlement of 
disputes between investors and host states, counterclaims are only rarely used in the 
proceedings. According to the UNCTAD statistics, there are over 800 known treaty-
based investor-state arbitrations, yet counterclaims were filed and effectively addressed 
in less than 30 of them.
6
 One of the reasons why host states remain “perpetual 
respondents”
7
 without the opportunity to adopt a more offensive tactics against 
investors is the language of IIAs that determines whether counterclaims can be heard or 
not. This paper, therefore, examines the obstacles that host states must overcome both 
on procedural, as well as substantive grounds and proposes the possible wording of IIAs 
which would permit host states to defend human rights. 
As any dispute settlement mechanism, investment arbitration is based on the 
mutual consent of both parties which determines the scope of jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal.
8
 While a dispute settlement clause in an IIA generally provides for jurisdiction 
over claims of an investor, this fact does not necessarily mean that jurisdiction equally 
extends over host state’s counterclaims. Since the consent to counterclaims is dependent 
on the wording of the dispute settlement clauses in individual IIAs, a question arises as 
to which language would effectively enable host states to bring their claims in the 
proceedings. 
Apart from the jurisdictional obstacles, counterclaims must have a close legal 
and factual connection to claimant’s primary claims in order to be admissible in 
investment arbitration.
9
 Although this requirement has been consistently applied in all 
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types of international litigation,
10
 this paper argues that treaty-based tribunals have 
adopted an unjustifiably narrow approach which does not reflect the specific features of 
international investment law. In the light of these facts, this paper analyses the case law 
of the ICJ, the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal and arbitral tribunals to determine 
whether the connexity requirement is reasonable in treaty-based arbitration. 
Finally, IIAs do not usually regulate non-commercial aspects of investor’s 
activities in the territory of host states, such as protection of environment or human 
rights.
11
 To find legal support for their claims, host states, therefore, need to rely on 
other sources of law, such as contracts or domestic law, whose application by 
investment tribunals is often questionable. Given all these controversies, this paper 
intends to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. What is the required wording of dispute settlement clauses in IIAs permitting 
arbitral tribunals to establish their jurisdiction over counterclaims? 
2. How should arbitral tribunals interpret the requirement of legal and factual 
connection between a primary claim and a counterclaim? 
3. Which provisions in IIAs could enable host states to invoke substantive 
obligations of investors under various legal sources?   
Before further examination of the methodology, it is necessary to point to the 
limitations of this paper. While the analysis addresses important procedural and 
substantive issues related to counterclaims, it does not deal with the types of human 
rights obligations owed by investors as private entities under international law. In light 
of the recent arbitral award in Urbaser v. Argentina,
12
 this topic has undeniably given 
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  DOUGLAS, Zachary (2009). The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 256. 
11
  The recent investment treaty practice, however, adopts a different approach. For example, Article 13 
of the 2007 COMESA Investment Agreement requires that investors comply with “all applicable 
domestic measures of the Member State in which their investment is made”. Furthermore, Part III of 
the 2012 Model BIT for the SADC goes even further by imposing on investors obligations related to 
anti-corruption measures, compliance with domestic laws, environmental impact, human rights and 
minimum labor standards. Equally, India’s 2015 Model BIT provides for obligations of investors in 
the area of anti-corruption measures, compliance with host state’s taxation as well as domestic 
legislation. 
12
  In this case, the dispute arose out of the termination of a concession for water and sewerage services 
granted to the claimant’s subsidiary. During the ICSID proceedings, Argentina filed a counterclaim 
alleging that through their failure to make appropriate investment, the claimants had breached 
international human rights obligations, namely the right to water. The tribunal agreed that the 
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rise to many questions, however, the paper does not intend to contribute to this 
discussion. 
 
1.2 Sources and method 
To provide answers to the research questions, the analysis primarily draws upon 
the case law of arbitral tribunals which dealt with counterclaims against investors. 
Although investment arbitration can be initiated both through a contract, concluded 
directly between an investor and a host state,
13
 as well as an IIA, this paper examines 
only the case law in treaty-based arbitrations where counterclaims face a number of 
procedural and substantive obstacles. Apart from the reasoning of the tribunals, the 
analysis also addresses the language of individual IIAs out of which the disputes arose. 
As for the secondary sources, this paper relies on academic articles and 
commentaries of the case law in investment arbitration. Up to the present, there is no 
publication which would comprehensively address the issues related to counterclaims in 
investment arbitration. So far, such study exists only with regard to counterclaims 
before the ICJ
14
 and provides, therefore, merely a useful context for this paper. 
Furthermore, most of the published articles restrict themselves to particular issues in 
relation to counterclaims, such as the requirement of consent, or the evaluation of recent 
case law. For these reasons, the aim of this paper is to synthesize the accessible 
information to provide a complex framework for the bringing of counterclaims in 
treaty-based arbitration. 
In the light of the research questions, this paper applies the method of analysis of 
the case law and synthesis of the reasoning of individual arbitral tribunals that is 
                                                                                                                                               
Argentina-Spain BIT primarily imposed obligations on host states rather than on investors, but 
rejected Urbaser’s argument that corporations cannot be subject of obligations under international 
law. See Urbaser v. Argentina, paras. 1185 and 1195. 
13
  Investment contracts are bilateral agreements between private entities and host states which regulate 
the administration of investment projects. Due to the incorporation of dispute settlement clauses 
permitting the initiation of arbitration, they played a crucial role in guaranteeing the protection to the 
investments of investors in the territory of host states before the expansion of IIAs. See ŠTURMA, 
Pavel, BALAŠ, Vladimír (2012). Ochrana mezinárodních investic v kontextu obecného 
mezinárodního práva. Studie z mezinárodního práva č. 3 (Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 
Právnická fakulta), pp. 26-28.  
14
  ANTONOPOULOS, Constantine (2011). Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press). 
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supplemented with the comparative study of the language of individual IIAs. This 
combination enables to explain the differences in the outcomes of the decisions about 
counterclaims and to formulate propositions for the drafting of provisions that would 
permit the successful filing of counterclaims.   
The final note in this section concerns the terminology applied in this paper. In 
the context of general debates about investment arbitration, this paper refers to 
international investment agreements (IIAs) which comprise both bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), such as the OIC Treaty. 
Where the discussion relates to a specific case, this paper refers to the individual BIT or 
TIP instead. 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces three research 
questions regarding procedural and substantive aspects of counterclaims which will be 
addressed in individual sections of the paper. It further describes the methodology of the 
study and presents the sources upon which the analysis is based. The theoretical part of 
the paper is concluded by Chapter 2 which outlines individual features of counterclaims 
in international litigation and distinguishes between counterclaims and other legal 
actions of respondents, such as the defence on the merits and set-offs. Finally, Chapter 2 
examines the role of counterclaims in investment arbitration, explaining its potential 
advantages and disadvantages. 
With regard to the procedural issues, Chapter 3 assesses the requirement of 
consent to counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration. Firstly, this section studies the 
requirements for counterclaims in the procedural rules most often applied by investment 
tribunals. It then provides a general explanation of parties’s consent to counterclaims 
under IIAs and concludes by examining the wording of dispute settlement provisions 
with regard to the jurisdiction ratione materiae and locus standi. Chapter 4 then moves 
to the analysis of the admissibility of counterclaims in investment arbitration. After 
introducing the connection test between a primary claim and a counterclaim, the section 
further examines its application by the ICJ and the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal. 
Finally, Chapter 4 maps the influence of their findings on the analysis of the 
admissibility of counterclaims by investment tribunals.  
7 
 
 Turning to the substantive issues, Chapter 5 describes individual provisions of 
IIAs which could be invoked as causes of action for bringing counterclaims before 
arbitral tribunals. The section, therefore, focuses on the language of IIAs to identify 
provisions that establish investors’ obligations by themselves or by reference to other 
sources of law.  
 The conclusion of this paper summarizes the findings in previous chapters and 
provides answers to the research questions set out in Chapter 1. Building on the analysis 
of procedural and substantive hurdles of counterclaims in investment arbitration, the 
conclusion outlines possible solutions for rebalancing the asymmetric positions of 




2 COUNTERCLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Definition of counterclaim 
 In essence, a counterclaim is a claim made by the respondent in opposition to a 
claim presented by the claimant within the same proceedings.
15
 The bringing of  
a counterclaim is not an exercise of the right to defence, but, in the words of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, it rather “appears as a counter-attack.”
16
 Counterclaims are  
an independent cause of action, the success or failure of which is not dependent on the 
fate of the claimant’s primary claim.
17
 At the same time, they are, however, also 
connected to the primary claim as they must be based on the same legal and factual 
context.
18
 A contrario, as Judge Weeramantry aptly summarized: 
[A] claim that is autonomous and has no bearing on the determination 
of the initial claim does not thus qualify as a counterclaim.
19
 
 A counterclaim is a legal action which is generally admitted in all domestic legal 
systems. Despite its origin, the institute has been, without much controversy, transposed 
into international procedural law as a general principle of law in light of Article 38(1)(c) 
of the Statute of the ICJ.
20
 Discussions, nevertheless, remain as to whether 
                                                 
15
  ANTONOPOULOS, Constantine (2011). Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice 
 (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press), p. 50; ATANASOVA, Dafina, MARTINEZ BENOIT, Adrian, 
OSTŘANSKÝ, Josef (2014). The Legal Framework for Counterclaims in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration. Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 359. 
16
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Reports 2010, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 17. 
17
  RENTELN, Alison D. (1986). Encountering Counterclaims. Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, Vol. 15, p. 380. 
18
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Framework for Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Journal of International Arbitration, 
Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 378. 
19
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
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Reports 1997, Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, p. 291. 
20
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counterclaims should operate in the same manner as in municipal law or adapt to the 
field of public international law. While the former approach has been advocated by 
Judges Weeramantry and Trindade in their dissenting opinions,
21
 international courts 
introduced modified rules on counterclaims to address the consensual nature of their 
jurisdiction.
22
   
 The possibility to raise counterclaims has been available since the beginnings of 
treaty arbitration.
23
 One of the earliest examples of disputes involving counterclaims 
was the Behring Sea Seal Fishing arbitration between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom brought a counterclaim based on Article VIII of the 
1892 Arbitration Treaty which entitled each contracting party to submit any question of 
fact in connection with the presented claims to the tribunal.
24
 In the aftermath of the 
World War I, counterclaims were expressly incorporated also in the rules of the Anglo-
Austrian, Anglo-Bulgarian and Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunals: 
Where a Defendant seeks to rely upon any matters contained in his 
Answer as the grounds of a counterclaim he must in his Answer state 
specifically that he does so by way of a counterclaim.
25
 
The central rationale underlying counterclaims is the principle of sound 
administration of justice and procedural economy, allowing the judicial bodies to have 
better overview of the parties’s claims and decide disputes in a more consistent 
                                                 
21
  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ 
Reports 2010, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 4; Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, 
Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, p. 291. 
22
  ANTONOPOULOS, Constantine (2011). Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice  
(The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press), p. 56. 
23
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Agreements (IIAs). The Graduate Institute of Geneva, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, 
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24
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 For these reasons, counterclaims were eventually codified in the rules of 
international courts, such as the PCIJ and the ICJ,
27
 as well as the rules governing the 
settlement of disputes between investors and host states.  
 
2.2 Distinction from a defence on the merits and set-offs 
Counterclaims are distinguishable from other legal actions which can be pursued 
by the respondent in judicial or arbitral proceedings. A defence on the merits is a 
submission presented by a respondent which bears features of a claim but is devised to 
render the claimant’s primary claim devoid of its factual or legal basis.
28
 In other words, 
the purpose of a defence on the merits is the defeat of the claimant’s original claim. By 
way of example, the plea of force majeure by a respondent facing a claim of non-
performance of its contractual obligations against the claimant, as argued by Iran in 
Gould Marketing, Inc v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran before the Iran/United 
States Claims Tribunal, constitutes precisely an instance of a defence on the merits.
29
  
Contrary to the defence on the merits, by a counterclaim the respondent seeks a 
decision in its favour “over and above the dismissal”
30
 of claimant’s claims. The 
respondent might, therefore, deny claimant’s primary claim while requesting damages 
for a breach of claimant’s obligations. In this respect, a counterclaim has a dual 
character; it reacts to the primary claim made by the claimant but, at the same time, also 
                                                 
26
  HAMIDA, Walid B. (2005). L’arbitrage Etat-investisseur cherche son équilibre perdu: Dans quelle 
mesure l’Etat peut introduire des demandes reconventionnelles contre l’investisseur privé? 
International Law FORUM du droit international, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 270-271; Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, p. 275. 
27
  Rules of the PCIJ, Art. 40; Rules of the ICJ, Art. 80. 
28
  ANTONOPOULOS, Constantine (2011). Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice  
(The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press), p. 60. 
29
  Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 24-49-
2, 27 July 1983, 3 Iran-US CTR. 
30
  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, para. 29. 
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The respondent may further preserve its interests by bringing set-offs which aim 
at reducing, balancing or neutralizing a monetary claim made by the claimant in full or 
in part.
32
 Similarly to counterclaims, set-offs are presented to avoid circuitry of action as 
they allow mutual extinction of parties’ claims within the same judicial proceedings. On 
the other hand, a set-off defence only allows the respondent to reduce the amount for 
which it is liable and as such cannot, therefore, exceed the claimant’s original claim.
33
 
In the opposite case, the respondent would have to initiate separate litigation in order to 
recover its damages in their entirety.  
Apart from the procedural aspects, the fate of set-offs is highly dependent on the 
original claims presented by the claimant. Consequently, once the tribunal finds against 
the primary claim of the claimant, set-offs cannot be heard at all.
34
 As famously 
described by Sir Cockburn CJ, set-offs can only be used due to their defensive nature 




2.3 Role of counterclaims in investment arbitration 
Despite their rare use up to the present, counterclaims could have a significant 
impact on the shaping of investment arbitration. From the procedural point of view, 
counterclaims may presumably enhance the overall efficiency of complex proceedings 
which are often simultaneously pursued before investment tribunals and domestic 
                                                 
31
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ 
Reports 1997, p. 256. 
32
  ANTONOPOULOS, Constantine (2011). Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice  
(The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press), p. 65. 
33
  KEE, Christopher (2005). Set-off in International Commercial Arbitration: What can the Asian 
region learn? Asian International Arbitration Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 146; KARRER, Pierre A. 
(1986). Arbitration Saves Costs: Poker and Hide-and-Seek. Journal of International Arbitration, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 35 and 38. 
34
  PAVIC, Vladimir (2006). Counterclaim and Set-off in International Arbitration. Annals 
International Edition, p. 104; Oxus Gold plc v. Republic of Uzbekistan, the State Committee of 
Uzbekistan for Geology & Mineral Resources, and Navoi Mining & Metallurgical Kombinat, 
UNCITRAL, Award, 17 December 2015, para. 972 (“Oxus Gold v. Uzbekistan”). 
35
  Stooke v. Taylor [1880], 5 Queen’s Bench Division 569, para. 575. 
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courts, with decision-makers being unaware of the whole picture of the case.
36
 In this 
respect, the concentration of all claims related to the same cluster of events through 
counterclaims would enable arbitrators to become well acquainted about all relevant 
facts and, consequently, to render fairer decisions.
37
 Having one hearing and one legal 




Furthermore, allowing counterclaims could discourage host states from filing 
frivolous objections to jurisdiction, thus enabling arbitral tribunals to address the merits 
of the disputes.
39
 In other words, host states as “perpetual respondents”
40
 in investment 
arbitration could adopt a more offensive tactics against investors. Without this ability, 
investment arbitration could remain a rigid dispute settlement procedure where “a state 
cannot win; the most it can hope to do is not lose.”
41
 In this context, counterclaims 
could have, however, also an opposite effect. Investors, who have to take into 
consideration claims that might be filed against them, could be less willing to initiate 
arbitral proceedings in the first place. Therefore, permitting counterclaims could 
eventually diminish the protection of investors which has formed the rationale of 
international investment law from its beginnings. 
 Apart from the benefits during the investment proceedings, the adjudication of 
counterclaims by arbitral tribunals would have a significant impact also for the stage of 
                                                 
36
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37
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38
  KJOS, Hege E. (2007). Counterclaims by Host States in Investment Treaty Arbitration. 
Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 4, No. 4 (www.transnational-dispute-management. 
com/article.asp?key=1026, last accessed on 30 March 2018). 
39
  KRYVOI, Yaraslau (2011). Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration. LSE, Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 8/2011 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1891935, 
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 Awards rendered by arbitral tribunals might be enforced either under the 
ICSID Convention or the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards. Both mechanisms require that signatory states recognize arbitral 
awards rendered in other countries as decisions of their domestic courts, allowing for 
only a very limited list of exceptions for their challenge.
43
 Judgments of domestic courts 
are, to the contrary, subject to enforcement laws of countries in which the unsuccessful 
party has its assets and may be extensively reviewed.
44
 In this respect, counterclaims 
would ensure greater equality between investors and host states in investment 
arbitration. 
A frequent objection to this call is that the unfairness under IIAs is in fact crucial 
for rebalancing the existing asymmetry between investors and host states. International 
investment law was developed to stimulate the flow of investment by moderating the 
political risk related to the host state’s sovereign powers.
45
 As a consequence, it is the 
conduct of the host state, not that of investor, that should be regulated in more detail. 
Taking into account the capital of individual parties, this argument has fundamental 
flaws. Some foreign investors have economic muscle unrivalled by many developing 
countries, with turnovers far exceeding state budgets,
46
 as was clearly visible, for 
instance, in the proceedings brought by the multi-billion-dollar tobacco company Phillip 
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 In this regard, investment arbitration should be able to 
restraint equally the conduct of investors as that of host states. 
Perhaps more importantly, counterclaims may potentially contribute to address 
the growing criticism that investment arbitration is structurally biased against host 
states. Permitting governments to bring more counterclaims before tribunals would help 
to redress concerns regarding the asymmetry of the dispute settlement mechanism in 
which investors are entitled to rights and remedies while host state have neither.
48
 An 
equal access to a neutral forum was advocated also by the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan 
which held that: 
[i]t would be inequitable if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID 
jurisdiction, the [foreign investor] could on the one hand elevate its side 
of the dispute to international adjudication and, on the other, preclude 
the [host state] from pursuing its own claim for damages […].
49
 
On the other hand, a too expansive view of counterclaims could unintentionally 
further undermine the reputation of investment arbitration as such. To provide legal 
background for their claims, host states often rely on their domestic legislation. Under 
such circumstances, arbitrators would have to apply domestic law in which they cannot 
– unlike domestic judges – claim any special expertise.
50
 Counterclaims could, 
therefore, deprive domestic courts of their opportunity to hear disputes which might 
otherwise have been resolved locally. 
In conclusion, as a matter of policy, counterclaims seem to correct many 
deficiencies which have been at the center of long-term criticism. Indeed, it is ironic to 
force host states to bring their claims against investors only before domestic courts 
                                                 
47
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when the recourse to these courts is precisely what investment arbitration was designed 
to avoid.
51
 Their advantages should not, however, shadow potential risks to the 
legitimacy of investment arbitration which might siphon off disputes involving issues 
related to local laws from domestic courts.
52
 Given that arbitral tribunals need a 
particular expertise to justify their authority, they should hear only a limited range of 
counterclaims that are inextricably connected to the dispute before the arbitral tribunal.  
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3 JURISDICTION OVER COUNTERCLAIMS 
3.1 Requirement of consent in investment arbitration 
Similarly to commercial arbitration, consent is the organising principle for the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals.
53
 In its absence either on the side of a host state or 
an investor, the dispute cannot be heard in arbitral proceedings. In the context of treaty-




First, by concluding an IIA with another sovereign state, a host state extends its 
standing offer to arbitrate which is addressed to investors with the nationality of the 
other signatory state.
55
 This offer is irrevocable in that it remains valid for as long as the 
treaty is in force.
56
 As for the possible modalities, host states often, but not always, 
make their offer by giving unequivocal consent to arbitration.
57
 This would be the case 
where the dispute settlement provision in an IIA provides that “each Contracting Party 
hereby consents”
58
 or that a dispute “shall be submitted”
59
 to arbitration. However, not 
all IIAs contain a firm offer, but may incorporate an undertaking to give consent in the 
future instead.
60
 Although a refusal to do so would eventually constitute a breach of the 
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host state’s obligations under an IIA, a mere promise cannot operate as a substitute for 
host state’s binding offer to arbitrate.
61
 
 To establish jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, an investor, furthermore, has to 
accept the host state’s offer as set out in an IIA.
62
 While the treaties rarely provide for a 
specific form of acceptance, it is an established practice that investors may accept an 
offer by instituting arbitral proceedings.
63
 This was confirmed in Generation Ukraine v. 
Ukraine where the respondent argued against the tribunal’s jurisdiction because the 
claimant had not communicated its consent prior to initiating ICSID arbitration. The 
tribunal, however, did not accept this position, pointing to the absence of such 
requirement in the Ukraine-United States BIT.
64
 The reasoning of the tribunal implies 
that some IIAs might, on the other hand, expressly provide that investors must give their 
written consent to arbitration before initiating the proceedings. One of the examples is 
the Canada-Philippines BIT that reads: 
An investor may submit a dispute […] to arbitration […] only if: 
(a) the investor has consented in writing thereto […]
65
 
Irrespective of the timing of investor’s acceptance, once expressed, it culminates 
in the parties’ arbitration agreement that forms the basis of the overall consent to 
arbitration and, therefore, the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the case.
66
 In light of the 
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principle of kompetenz/kompetenz, the tribunal alone determines the validity of parties’ 
consent and the scope of its jurisdiction to settle a dispute under an IIA.
67
 
As follows from the explanation above, the consent “without privity”
68
 is a 
hallmark in treaty-based arbitrations as its scope is not mutually agreed by the parties, 
but it is the state who “sets the rule of the game”
69
 through its offer. The offer does not, 
however, affect only jurisdiction in general, but also the host states’ entitlement to bring 
counterclaims against investors.
70
 In other words, for a counterclaim to fall within the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, it has to be incorporated in the offer to arbitrate. This principle 
was confirmed by the tribunal in Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania which noted that: 
The investor’s consent to the BIT’s arbitration clause can only exist in 
relation to counterclaims if such counterclaims come within the consent 
of the host state as expressed in the BIT.
71
 
To allow a host state the bringing of counterclaims before an arbitral tribunal, 
the offer to arbitrate counterclaims must be equally accepted by investors. In several 
disputes, investors have, nevertheless, raised a defence that their consent to arbitration 
was limited to their own claims and did not extend to the host states’ right to advance 
counterclaims.
72
 The debate about the modification of host state’s offer is far from 
being settled. Some authors argue that investor’s acceptance relates to the offer as an 
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 By initiating arbitral proceedings against the host state, the investor 
accepts the host state’s offer as it stands in the IIA.
74
 It cannot decide to arbitrate only 
its own claims by making “an à la carte selection of provisions”
75
 of the treaty to be 
applied in the proceedings.  
This approach was advocated in ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited  
v. Argentina where the tribunal made the following observation: 
At the time of commencing dispute resolution under the treaty, the 
investor can only accept or decline the offer to arbitrate, but cannot 
vary its terms. The investor, regardless of the particular circumstances 
affecting the investor or its belief in the utility or fairness of the 
conditions attached to the offer of the host State, must nonetheless 
contemporaneously consent to the application of the terms and 
conditions of the offer made by the host State, or else no agreement to 
arbitrate may be formed.
76
 
Equally, the tribunal in the recent case Urbaser v. Argentina confirmed that the 
claimant’s acceptance had to mirror Argentina’s offer to arbitrate, otherwise there had 
been no arbitration agreement between the parties.
77
 As follows, tribunals qualified host 
state’s offers as “take it or leave it” options, excluding the power of investors to alter its 
scope. 
The same conclusion would be reached, were the acceptance of an investor as a 
private entity analysed through the general contract theory, as suggested by Sourgens 
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 Under these terms, a response of a private party which modifies the 
original offer by a public party should be understood as a counteroffer. This implies that 




On the other hand, the contrary opinion does not lack support either. According 
to Shihata and Parra, to establish the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the consent of an investor 
does not need to be broader than necessary to allow the bringing only of investor’s 
claims.
80
 Such approach is, however, highly undesirable as it would turn investment 
arbitration strictly to a “one-way road” where investors may advance their claims while 
forcing host states to seek relief in their own courts or another forum, despite the 
wording of an IIA. In the context of this debate, the middle-ground argument proposed 
by Professor Schreuer, therefore, appears to be the most plausible. Mindful of the role 
of investor’s acceptance, he notes that the jurisdiction of individual tribunals is 
restricted to the claims brought by the investors into the proceedings. However, this 
does not mean that investors have unlimited power to exclude those counterclaims 
which are closely connected to their original complaints.
81
 
In conclusion, the obstacles related to consent to host states’ counterclaims are 
unique in the context of investment treaty arbitrations. In comparison, contract-based 
tribunals have traditionally found little difficulty in adjudicating counterclaims which 
derived from a pre-existing contract concluded directly between an investor and a host 
state.
82
 In contractual investment disputes, the consent of both parties is expressed in 
one instrument that also contains easily identifiable obligations not only for a host state, 
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but also for an investor.
83
 Since the same does not hold true for treaty-based arbitration, 
the consent in such cases requires careful examination.  
 
3.2 Arbitration rules 
For the purpose of settling disputes between host states and investors, IIAs 
contain provisions governing the arbitration procedure (lex arbitri). The treaties may 
provide for a specific body of rules in this respect,
84
 but most often they refer to 
standard arbitration rules such as the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, ICC Arbitration Rules or SCC Arbitration Rules. Insofar as these mechanisms 
are included in the dispute settlement clause of an IIA, they are supposed to be 
considered as a part of parties’ consent. For these reasons, before turning to the question 
related to the scope of consent to counterclaims under IIAs, it is crucial to examine how 
individual arbitration rules approach the issue of counterclaims and, more specifically, 
the requirements for raising counterclaims as such.  
 
3.2.1 ICSID Convention 
In 1965, the IBRD formulated the ICSID Convention with the aim of 
encouraging the flow of investments and stimulating the growth of developing 
economies.
85
 For this purpose, the Convention established the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes providing tools for the resolution of disputes 
between investors and host states, such as arbitration or conciliation.  
The rules for filing counterclaims in arbitration procedures under the Centre’s 
jurisdiction are embodied in Article 46 of the ICSID Convention: 
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Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by  
a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims 
arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that 
they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre.
86
 
 This provision sets out three conditions to be complied with in order to file  
a counterclaim, except otherwise expressed by the parties. First, the counterclaim must 
fall within the consent of the parties to a dispute. The requirement does not, however, 
relate to the procedural rules under the Convention, but to the specific arbitration offer 
in the IIA applicable to the dispute.
87
 Executive Board Comment 24 provides further 
guidance in this regard, noting that the consent may be included in an investment 
agreement or in a compromis regarding an existing dispute, without being “expressed in 
a single instrument.”
88
 Second, Article 46 anticipates the factual and legal connection 
between a counterclaim and the primary claim. This condition was further elaborated in 
the 1968 Arbitration Rules that required the adjudication of counterclaims in order to 
“dispose of all the grounds of dispute arising out of the same subject matter.”
89
 Finally, 
the counterclaim must fulfil the general requirements of Article 25 of the Convention to 
fit within the jurisdiction of the Centre, which means that the counterclaim must directly 
arise out of an investment.
90
 
In the context of the Convention, counterclaims play an important role in 
ensuring equal protection of both investors and host states. This objective was explicitly 
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stressed by the Executive Board of the World Bank which recognized the importance of 
maintaining a careful balance between the interests of the parties to a dispute: 
[…] the Convention permits the institution of proceedings by host 
States as well as investors and the Executive Directors have constantly 
had in mind that the provisions of the Convention should be equally 
adapted to the requirements of both cases.
91
 
Furthermore, the principle of efficient protection and finality was also endorsed in the 
1968 Model Clauses that originally provided only for claims made by investors, 





3.2.2 ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
The ICSID Additional Facility Rules were formulated in 1978 to facilitate the 
settlement of disputes outside the scope of the ICSID Convention through arbitration, 
conciliation or fact-finding.
93
 Article 47 of the Additional Facility Rules permits the 
filing of counterclaims, provided that they fall within the arbitration agreement of the 
parties. Unlike the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules do not require the 
application of a three-fold test. This is confirmed by the wording of Article 3: 
Since the proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, none of the provisions of the Convention 
shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, awards, or reports 
which may be rendered therein.
94
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Apart from the condition of consent, the Additional Facility Rules do not pose 
further restrictions for the filing of counterclaims, leaving it to the consideration of 
arbitral tribunals whether they fall within their jurisdiction.
95
 Such decision may, 
however, only take place, had the counterclaim been filed in the respondent’s 




3.2.3 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were initially adopted for the settlement of 
disputes arising in the context of international commercial relations,
97
 but have been 
also extensively used by ad hoc investment treaty tribunals. Before turning to the 
current version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the wording of the 1976 edition of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules requires a brief analysis.  
 Article 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules requires that 
counterclaims arise “out of the same contract”. While contract-based arbitrations do not 
pose any difficulty in this respect, the application of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules gains more complexity with regard to disputes concerning treaty violations in the 
absence of an investment contract. The tribunals have, however, bypassed this 
procedural obstacle by relying solely on the scope of consent in individual BITs, 
without discussing the actual language of the Rules.
98
 
The narrow wording of Article 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
has been widely criticized as “inappropriate to arbitration arising under international 
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 To bridge the lacuna, the UNCITRAL Working Group on Arbitration and 
Conciliation proposed to modify the provision “so as to allow counter-claims that were 
substantially connected to (or arose out of) the initial claim.”
100
 Eventually, the 
provision was replaced by Article 21(3) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
which reads: 
In its statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings 
if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under the 
circumstances, the respondent may make a counterclaim or rely on a 




 Compared to the ICSID Convention, Article 21(3) of the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules does not explicitly prescribe any requirements for the bringing of 
counterclaims. Although the tribunals are left with a wide discretion in determining 
their jurisdiction as well as admissibility of counterclaims in individual cases, they do 
not depart from previous practice and apply the connection test, inspired by Article 46 




3.2.4 SCC and ICC Arbitration Rules 
 The SCC Arbitration Rules and ICC Arbitration Rules lay down only a general 
framework for the filing of counterclaims. According to the SCC Arbitration Rules, 
counterclaims shall be outlined in Respondent’s Answer to Claimant’s request for 
arbitration.
103
 The Rules, however, remain silent on any further conditions, including 
the parties’ consent and connection between a claim and a counterclaim. Despite their 
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absence, the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine explained that its jurisdiction over Ukraine’s 
counterclaim depended on: 
the terms of the dispute resolution provisions of the treaty, the nature of 
the counterclaim, and the relationship of the counterclaims with the 
claims in the arbitration.
104 
 
The tribunal, therefore, confirmed uniform application of these requirements, 
irrespective of the nature of the rules governing the dispute settlement procedure. 
 Similarly to the SCC Arbitration Rules, the ICC Arbitration Rules refer to 
counterclaims only in connection with the written submissions of the parties, providing 
that “[a]ny counterclaims made by the respondent shall be submitted with the 
Answer.”
105
 So far, there has not been any investment arbitration under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules where counterclaims were brought before a tribunal.
106
 Nevertheless, 
given the similar nature of the rules, the approach adopted by the tribunals which 
operated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the SCC Arbitration Rules could 
be reasonably followed.  
 
3.3 Consent to counterclaims under IIAs 
Despite the practice of examining the wording of arbitration rules in the first 
place, arbitral tribunals standardly derive their jurisdiction from the scope of parties’ 
consent as expressed in the applicable IIA.
107
 This reasoning was endorsed, for instance, 
in Saluka v. Czech Republic where the tribunal relied on the broad wording of the 
                                                 
104
  Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Award, 26 March 2008, para. 
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dispute settlement clause in Article 8 of the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT, which 
referred to “all disputes”, to conclude:  
The Tribunal agrees that, in principle, the jurisdiction conferred upon it  
by Article 8, particularly when read with Article 19.3, 19.4 and 21.3 of 
the UNCITRAL Rules, is in principle wide enough to encompass 
counterclaims.
108
   
As the citation shows, the tribunal focused on the wording of the BIT itself, 
rather than on the requirements under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
According to its analysis, the Rules were, therefore, of no impact on the determination 
of the scope of parties’ consent and consequently the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the 
counterclaims in that case.
109
 The same approach was adopted in Paushok v. Mongolia 
where the tribunal invoked a similar dispute settlement provision in Article 6 of the 
Mongolia-Russian Federation BIT, applying to “[d]isputes between one of the 
Contracting Parties and an investor of the other Contracting Party”, to find that the 
parties’ consent was sufficiently broad to encompass Mongolia’s counterclaims.
110
  
 A minority view to the determination of the scope of consent was taken by 
Professor W. Michael Reisman in Roussalis v. Romania case which was decided under 
the ICSID Convention. Although the Greece-Romania BIT limited the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction only to disputes “concerning an obligation of the [host State]”, Professor 
Reisman disagreed with the majority decision that the counterclaims presented by 
Romania fell out of the parties’ consent under the BIT, advocating the need for 
procedural economy and cost saving.
111
 The same opinion was articulated by the 
tribunal in Goetz v. Burundi which equally expressed its willingness to import the 
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consent component in Article 46 of the ICSID Convention into any ICSID arbitration, 
pointing to the inefficiency of parallel proceedings before different fora.
112
  
 Although the teleological interpretation could be justifiable, it runs contrary to 
the intention of the drafters of the ICSID Convention. As explained in the travaux 
préparatoires, Article 46 of the ICSID Convention was “in no way intended to extend 
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.”
113
 In other words, the principle of procedural 
economy cannot substitute for the absence of consent to counterclaims under an IIA.  
Unsurprisingly, the same view was defended in non-ICSID arbitrations. In Oxus 
v. Uzbekistan case, adjudicated under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the 
tribunal was established under the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan BIT which applied only 
to disputes concerning the obligations of Uzbekistan. In the light of such narrow 
wording, the tribunal stated: 
As concerns Article 21(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the 
Arbitral Tribunal does not consider that this provision creates a 
jurisdiction where there is none. All it does is stating that counter-
claims are admissible and can be submitted to the extent that they 
already fall under the scope of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
114
 
 As a consequence, the lack of consent to counterclaims under an IIA is fatal and 
cannot be surpassed by a mere reference to arbitration rules. Despite being a part of the 
general consent, these procedural instruments may not on their own extend the scope of 
tribunal’s jurisdiction so as to cover counterclaims. 
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3.4 Jurisdition ratione materiae 
The definition of a dispute which can be submitted to arbitration under an IIA 
has a direct impact on host state’s right to bring counterclaims. In the context of 
investment treaty law, the scope of a dispute may be formulated in broad or narrow 
terms, determining the jurisdiction ratione materiae. In general, there are three types of 
provisions which are commonly used in IIAs for the purpose of defining the scope of 
disputes in arbitration. 
The first type of dispute settlement clauses refers to “all” or “any” disputes 
relating to an investment. This is by far the broadest formulation which has made it 
possible for tribunals to accept jurisdiction over counterclaims. The first case to discuss 
this wording was Saluka v. Czech Republic where the tribunal was required to interpret 
Article 8 of the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT: 
(1) All disputes between one Contracting Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter shall if 
possible, be settled amicably.  
(2) Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit a dispute referred 
to in paragraph (1) of this Article, to an arbitral tribunal, if the dispute 
has not been settled amicably within a period of six months from the 
date either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement. 
Referring to the phrase “all disputes”, the tribunal rejected claimant’s reasoning 
that it had not provided its consent to counterclaims, and proceeded with the analysis of 
the connexity between Saluka’s primary claims and Czech Republic’s counterclaims.
115
 
This approach was later followed in Paushok v. Mongolia,
116
 Inmaris Perestroika 
Sailing Maritime Services v. Ukraine,
117
 Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan,
118
  Al Warraq v. 
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 and Urbaser v. Argentina,
120
 all of which were based on dispute settlement 
clauses with similar wording.  
So far, there have been two exceptions to this pattern where tribunals decided to 
decline their jurisdiction in spite of the “counterclaim-friendly” language of the BITs. 
First, in the ICSID arbitration Fraport v. Philippines, Philippines raised twelve 
counterclaims related to the inoperability of an international airport tribunal in 
Manila.
121
 Although Article 9 of the Germany-Philippines BIT provided for the 
settlement of “all kinds of divergencies […] concerning an investment”, the tribunal 
refused to exercise jurisdiction over Philippines’ counterclaims, noting that Fraport’s 
claims lacked protection due to investor’s illegal conduct.
122
 In this regard, the reasons 
for the dismissal of Philippines’ counterclaims were not associated with the wording of 
the BIT, but with the lack of jurisdiction over Fraport’s primary claims. Contrarily, in 
Teinver v. Argentina the tribunal refused to hear Argentina’s counterclaim mainly due 
to deficiencies in the respondent’s submission which failed to identify any legal right or 
obligation of Teinver. Pointing to the absence of the legal basis of Argentina’s 
counterclaim, the tribunal concluded that it fell out of the scope of consent to 
arbitrate.
123
 As follows, the jurisdiction in both cases was rejected under specific 
circumstances unrelated to the language of the BITs. 
The second type of dispute settlement clauses extends the scope of tribunal’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae to disputes arising out of an investment agreement, 
investment authorization or a breach of rights under an IIA. For instance, Article 6  
of the Estonia-United States BIT reads: 
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For the purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute 
between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising of 
or relating to: 
(a) an investment agreement between that Party and such national or 
company;  
(b) an investment authorization granted by that Party’s foreign 
investment authority to such national or company; or  
(c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty 
with respect to an investment. 
Although these provisions appeared in five cases, four tribunals did not discuss 
jurisdictional issues whatsoever and directly proceeded with the examination of 
merits.
124
 In Goetz v. Burundi, the tribunal indeed analysed the requirement of consent 
to arbitrate counterclaims, however, it did so only in light of Article 46 of the ICSID 
Convention, not under the Belgium-Luxembourg-Burundi BIT.
125
 In spite of the fact 
that no tribunal effectively addressed this clause, it can be reasonably argued that it is 
favourable to the filing of counterclaims by host states. By making reference to other 
sources of law, such as investment authorizations and contracts, it enables respondent 
states to overcome the problem with missing obligations of investors under IIAs.
126
 For 
these reasons, such provisions could form a valid legal basis for the tribunals’ 
jurisdiction over host states’ counterclaims. 
Turning to the third type of dispute settlement clauses, some IIAs contain 
narrower formulations, limiting the scope of arbitrable disputes to those arising out of 
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non-fulfillment of obligations under an IIA. This wording is reflected, for example, in 
Article 8 of the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan BIT which provides: 
Disputes between a national or company of one Contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter under 
this Agreement in relation to an investment of the former which have 
not been amicably settled shall, after a period of three months from 
written notification to a claim, be submitted to international arbitration 
if the national or company concerned so wishes. 
Unless an IIA sets out any obligations for investors, such restrictive language of 
a dispute settlement clause would prevent the tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction 
over counterclaims.
127
 This view was also advocated by the majority of tribunals, 
dealing with similar wording of IIAs.
128
 So far, controversies have arisen only in 
Hamester v. Ghana where the tribunal agreed that Article 12 of the Germany-Ghana 
BIT permitted the bringing of counterclaims despite the narrow definition of disputes, 
limited to violations of host state’s obligations under the treaty. Noting that the BIT 
recognized the right of an “aggrieved party” to refer disputes to arbitration, it concluded 
that it would be entitled to hear counterclaims, provided other conditions were 
fulfilled.
129
 Put differently, the tribunal extended its jurisdiction ratione materiae 
through systematic interpretation of the BIT. 
Although the tribunal in Hamester v. Ghana eventually declined its jurisdiction 
over counterclaims,
130
 it could have reached a more precise conclusion. For instance, in 
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Oxus Gold v. Uzbekistan, the arbitration was initiated on the basis of the dispute 
settlement clause in the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan BIT, restricting the parties’ 
consent to disputes related to breaches of host state’s obligations. Pointing to the 
language of the provision, the tribunal dismissed Uzbekistan’s counterclaims: 
The wording of Article 8(1) of the BIT is for this Arbitral Tribunal a 
clear indication that the Parties’ consent to arbitration under the BIT 
only cover claims from investors against the host State, but not claims 
from the host State against the investors […].
131
 
In conclusion, it is easier for host states to assert counterclaims in investment 
arbitration where the definition of a dispute between an investor and a host state is 
broad, irrespective of the fact whether the formulation is rather generic or refers to other 
instruments separate from the IIA. 
 
3.5 Locus standi 
Another factor affecting the scope of consent over counterclaims is the right of 
parties to the dispute to institute proceedings under an IIA. Since counterclaims are 
subject to the same jurisdictional requirements as primary claims in investment 
arbitration, limited locus standi would effectively bar the bringing of counterclaims by a 
host state.
132
  To illustrate the importance of standing in investment arbitration, it is vital 
to examine its impact on the jurisdiction of tribunals in individual cases. 
First, the right to submit a dispute to arbitration may be expressly conferred only 
upon investors as potential claimants. One of the examples is Article 11 of the 
Germany-Ukraine BIT which reserves standing only to nationals or companies of one of 
the host states, being a contracting party to the BIT. The narrow wording, however, 
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does not by itself restrict host state’s own procedural rights. To the contrary, the 
emphasis on investor’s right could be interpreted as an expression of host state’s offer to 
arbitrate.
133
 In other words, the one-sided locus standi is a mere reflection of the 
standard practice in investment treaty arbitration where an arbitration agreement 
culminates upon the acceptance of host state’s offer. 
This argument was also supported by the tribunal in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan 
which examined its jurisdiction in the light of the following dispute settlement 
provision: 
If any such dispute should arise and cannot be resolved, amicably or 
otherwise, within three (3) months from written notification of the 
existence of the dispute, then the investor affected may institute 
conciliation or arbitration proceedings by addressing a request to that 
effect to the Secretary-General of the Centre, as provided in Article 28 
or 36 respectively of the Convention.
134
 
Although the Israel-Uzbekistan BIT expressly limits the standing to initiate proceedings 
only to investors, the tribunal was willing to accept jurisdiction over Uzbekistan’s 
counterclaim due to broad definition of arbitrable disputes.
135
 As follows, the limited 
locus standi is not on its own a decisive factor for the dismissal of counterclaims. 
 The same reasoning does not, nevertheless, apply to situations when one-sided 
standing is combined with narrow jurisdiction ratione materiae. In Rusoro Mining  
v. Venezuela, the tribunal extensively scrutinized the wording of the dispute settlement 
clause in Article 12 of the Canada-Venezuela BIT which allowed investors to institute 
arbitration for breaches of host state’s obligations under the treaty. Finally, it declined to 
exercise its jurisdiction over Venezuela’s counterclaim concerning Rusoro’s obligations 
under a mine plan, making the following observation: 
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The literal wording of Art. XII does not leave room for doubt: the 




As follows, the limited locus standi is one of the factors influencing the 
consideration of tribunals regarding the possibility to assert counterclaims. 
Nevertheless, in association with broadly worded offers to arbitrate with regards to the 
subject matter of the dispute, it does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims. 
 The second type of IIAs, contrarily, either identifies both parties as potential 
claimants or, in a more neutral manner, provides that any or all disputes may be 
submitted to international arbitration.
137
 In combination with broad jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, such provisions leave little doubt as to whether host states may bring 
counterclaims before arbitral tribunals. This idea was articulated by the tribunal in 
Urbaser v. Argentina, which operated under the Argentina-Spain BIT. Pointing to the 
generous wording of the dispute settlement clause, it stated that the BIT entitled both 
parties to initiate proceedings, therefore, even the bringing of counterclaims could not 
be a fortiori ruled out.
138
  
 To sum up, host states find themselves in the most favourable position where 
they are confronted with a broad dispute settlement clause both in terms of ratione 
materiae and ratione personae. The limitation in the latter, however, is not fatal to 
counterclaims since it steps aside to the benefit of broad subject-matter jurisdiction.  
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4 ADMISSIBILITY OF COUNTERCLAIMS 
4.1 Legal and factual connection 
Apart from the condition of consent, the next obstacle that host states have to 
contend with in relation to counterclaims in investment arbitration is the factual and 
legal connexity with a principal claim presented by an investor. This requirement is, in 
principle, applied by all adjudicative bodies before which counterclaims have been 
raised.
139
 The reason is apparent; procedural economy and sound administration of 
justice cannot be achieved if the courts or tribunals were seised with any unrelated 
claims, submitted often with the purpose of prolonging the proceedings.
140
 
The requirement of connection between a primary claim and a counterclaim is 
not regulated only by international instruments. Many national jurisdictions fixed this 
condition in their legal systems.
141
 In this respect, the connexity between primary claims 
and counterclaims became a well-established principle in legal proceedings, including 
arbitration. In treaty-based investment disputes, the requirement may be incorporated in 
IIAs
142
 or arbitration rules.
143
 However, where any reference to the connexity of 




In most investment arbitrations involving counterclaims, the question of 
requisite connection between a primary claim and a counterclaim has not been 
addressed. Counterclaims tend to be either dismissed due to the lack of consent or 
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because their close relation to primary claims of investors was deemed obvious to 
receive extensive attention. Only in several cases have arbitral tribunals expressly 
examined the admissibility of counterclaims, making specific observations as to their 
factual and legal connection to primary claims.
145
 In their analysis, these tribunals often 
sought guidance on the issue of counterclaims in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the 
Iran/United States Claims Tribunal or contract-based arbitrations. This section, 
however, puts forward a question whether such reliance is desirable in the specific 
context of treaty-based investment arbitration disputes. 
   
4.2 Distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility 
Unlike consent, which is a jurisdictional requirement in nature, the connexity 
issue pertains rather to the admissibility of counterclaims in the proceedings.
146
 
Although this distinction may appear only theoretical, it has serious consequences for 
both parties to the dispute. Since both concepts have, in practice, lent themselves to 
considerable confusion, it is vital to examine their pivotal features. 
In general terms, jurisdiction may be defined as “the power of the tribunal to 
hear the case.”
147
 As explained, the competence of tribunals is based on the parties’ 
consent which is, in turn, derived from the applicable IIA. In contradiction, 
admissibility is related to the power of a tribunal to hear a case at a particular point in 
time. In other words, admissibility concerns the suitability of a claim for adjudication by 
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a tribunal on the merits.
148
 The lack of any of these requirements by itself must lead to a 
dismissal of claims in their entirety, irrespective of the merits of the case.
149
 At the same 
time, there are substantial differences in their impact on further course of the 
proceedings. 
First, the critical date for establishing the tribunal’s jurisdiction is the date of the 
claimant’s request for arbitration, therefore, no later events may be taken into account 
for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis. In the event of the lack of compliance with 
jurisdictional conditions, tribunals are required to terminate the proceedings at their 
initial stage. By contrast, the analysis of admissibility of claims is not limited to facts 
existing at the beginning of the arbitration.
150
 Tribunals have greater flexibility with 
regard to inadmissible claims since they may only suspend the proceedings to allow the 
parties to meet the admissibility requirements.
151
 Furthermore, while admissibility 
comes into question only after the jurisdiction was firmly established, tribunals have 
broad latitude as to when they should assess admissibility issues. In this regard, the 
decision may be addressed together either in the jurisdictional stage or incorporated into 
an award on merits of the case.  
Second, a finding on jurisdiction is final, creating a res judicata obstacle. This 
implies that the decisions of arbitral tribunals concerning jurisdiction can be, in 
principle, reviewed by supervisory bodies, such as the ICSID annulment committee. On 
the other hand, a finding on admissibility does not prevent parties from re-litigating 
their case before an arbitral tribunal at a later stage when the temporary constraints are 
cured.
152
 For instance, inadmissibility of investor’s claims due to its failure to comply 
with the waiting period before filing a request for arbitration is no bar to a new 
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arbitration once such period has expired.
153
 As a consequence, decisions regarding 
admissibility of claims cannot be subject to an annulment review, unless supervisory 
bodies reclassify an issue as one affecting jurisdiction.
154
  
Despite the theoretical differences, arbitral tribunals have shown little interest in 
the strict delimitation of both concepts, blurring lines in relation to their content. Indeed, 
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility are frequently addressed together under the 
section of preliminary objections in the initial stage of proceedings, before the analysis 
of the merits of the case. The distinction can be, however, clearly determined based on a 
simple test. Where the respective party files objection in connection with the tribunal, 
the question is jurisdictional. On the other hand, if the objection refers to the claims that 
they cannot be heard by the tribunal at all, it should be properly characterized as the 
issue of admissibility.
155
 Such analysis gains even greater importance in relation to 
counterclaims which are often dismissed due to the missing connexity with primary 
claims presented by investors.
156
 As Jan Paulsson stressed, wrong classification of 
jurisdiction or admissibility may result in an unreasonable extension of the scope for 
challenging awards, “frustrating the parties’ expectation that their dispute be decided 
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4.3 Connection test in international litigation 
4.3.1 Case law of the ICJ 
 The conditions for bringing counterclaims before the ICJ are enshrined in Article 
80 of its Rules which provides that counterclaims can be entertained if they are “directly 
connected with the subject-matter of the claim”.
158
 Their admission does not expand the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction but merely extends the scope of the subject-matter of the dispute.
159
 
Put differently, the connection with a primary claim is an additional requirement, 
unrelated to the ICJ’s jurisdiction. The ICJ Rules deliberately lack any definition of 
direct connection, leaving the ICJ with a wide margin of discretion for its appreciation 
in individual cases.
160
 This approach was confirmed in the Oil Platforms case, where the 
United States submitted counterclaims asserting that its attacks were countermeasures to 
Iran’s previous illegal conduct.
161
 Having established its jurisdiction, the ICJ rejected 
Iran’s argument that there was no direct connection because US claims were too 
general.
162
 Instead, it declared that the determination of the legal and factual link of 




 As follows from its jurisprudence, the ICJ has applied a broad approach to 
identify the factual link. With regard to connection in fact, it does not require that the 
facts underlying both claims and counterclaims are identical as this would substantially 
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narrow the right to file counterclaims in the proceedings.
164
 By contrast, the ICJ is 
willing to declare counterclaims admissible provided the facts are of the same nature 
and arise out of the same factual matrix.
165
 As for the former condition, it seeks for 
events which fall into the same type of conduct or situation, irrespective of the identity 
of involved actors. In the Bosnian Genocide case, Bosnia objected that the facts which 
formed the basis of Yugoslavia’s counterclaim concerned the acts of genocide related to 
specific perpetrators and victims.
166
 The ICJ did not accept Bosnia’s argument, pointing 
to the same type of alleged conduct, namely the violation of the Genocide Convention, 
and found Yugoslavia’s counterclaim admissible.
167
 Turning to the requirement of the 
same factual matrix, the ICJ insisted that the facts giving rise to claims and 
counterclaims must have taken place in the same temporal and territorial context.
168
 
Therefore, in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, it found the complex of facts in the 
incidents along the borders of the two states over an extensive period of time.
169
 
Equally, in the Oil Platforms case, both claims and counterclaims were grounded in the 
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 Concerning the condition of connection in law, the jurisprudence of the ICJ 
makes clear that it is established where the parties pursue the same legal aim.
171
 At the 
same time, the ICJ was cautious about not adopting an overly extensive interpretation, 
emphasizing that the responsibility for violations giving rise to claims and 
counterclaims must be grounded in the same legal source of obligations, be it an 
international treaty or rule of customary law.
172
 In light of this reasoning, it rejected the 
third counterclaim presented by Uganda in the Congo v. Uganda case as the allegations 
of the breach of Congo’s obligations arose under the Lusaka Agreement, whereas 
Congo’s original claim sought to establish Uganda’s responsibility for violations of the 
prohibition of the use of force.
173
 
 To sum up, the direct connection has been evaluated by the ICJ on a strictly 
case-by-case basis both in facts and in law. While it was quite flexible in the application 
of the connexity test, it refused to accept a too broad definition of counterclaims, 
reflecting the warning of Judge Oda in the Oil Platforms case that such approach could 
lead to the following situation:  
[W]e put what may have originally been somewhat distinct matters into 
one melting-pot without making careful examination of the essential 
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4.3.2 Case law of the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal 
 The Iran/United States Claims Tribunal was established under the Algiers 
Declarations to settle disputes in the context of their mutual relations stemming from the 
1979 hostage crisis and subsequent freezing of assets by the United States. According to 
Article II(1) of the Algiers Accords, the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal was entitled 
to hear counterclaims which “arise out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence 
that constitutes the subject matter of national’s claim.”
175
 In view of the substantial 
attention paid to the issue of counterclaims, its jurisprudence was often cited in the 
awards of investment tribunals in treaty-based arbitrations. 
 In the majority of cases, the analysis of whether a counterclaim arises out of the 
same contract as the primary claim is rather straightforward and unproblematic. By 
contrast, a more sophisticated question is whether counterclaims are admissible on 
separate contracts from those invoked in relation to primary claims. The first decision of 
such kind was the American Bell v. Iran which dealt with three different contracts 
concluded to cover successive periods of time of continued performance of the same 
type of work within a single project. While the original claims relied on the second and 
third contract in question, the counterclaims themselves were presented in light of the 
first contract concluded for an interim period of three months. In its decision, the 
Iran/United States Claims Tribunal emphasized the specific circumstances under which 
all contracts were entered into and opined that all of them formed one single transaction 
for the purpose of admissibility of the counterclaims.
176
  
 A similar reasoning was endorsed in the seminal decision in the Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. v. Iran where the primary claims arose out of four contracts concerning 
the development of an Integrated Electronics Depot for the repair and maintenance of 
weapon and electronic systems while the counterclaims related to the Depot, yet were 
formed on the basis of separate contracts. Noting that there was a strong factual 
connection and the contracts were part of the same transaction, the Iran/United States 
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 In its jurisprudence, the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal, furthermore, made a 
clear distinction between counterclaims arising out of a contract and those arising from 
general domestic law. In principle, where any person or entity could have fulfilled the 
obligations under national law, irrespective of the existence of any specific contractual 
relationship, the counterclaim was deemed not to arise out of a contract and was 
consequently inadmissible. Contrarily, where a contract laid down specific obligations 
which did not exist in the domestic legislation, such rule did not apply.
178
  
As follows, the case law of the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal on 
counterclaims is substantially influenced by the existence of contracts between the 
parties to the dispute. This relation was reflected also in the wording of the Algiers 
Accords as such. While there is little doubt that these findings can be proportionately 
applied in the context of contract-based investment arbitrations, their value in treaty-
based disputes should be rather limited. However, the practice of treaty-based tribunals 
shows otherwise. 
  
4.4 Connection test in investment arbitration 
In the majority of cases brought before treaty-based tribunals, the connexity 
requirement has played a marginal role, being often omitted from the analysis of 
counterclaims.
179
 Its occasional application in investment arbitration has not been, 
however, uniform either. As the case law suggests, arbitral tribunals have adopted two 
distinct approaches. In the first category, they strictly followed the reasoning presented 
in the disputes decided by the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal and contract-based 
tribunals, putting equal emphasis on the factual and legal connection between primary 
claims and counterclaims. Since the tribunals required that counterclaims arose out of 
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the same legal source as investor’s primary claims, namely the respective IIA, host 
states were unsuccessful in these cases.  
 The first award of this kind was rendered by the UNCITRAL tribunal in Saluka 
v. Czech Republic, a case decided under the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT. In a 
partial privatisation, Saluka secured a minority shareholding in a state-owned bank 
which, due to a series of controversial measures, became insolvent and was put into 
involuntary administration and later sold.
180
 The Czech Republic submitted two types of 
counterclaims,
181
 one of them alleging violations of general domestic law by the 
investor. The tribunal first held that it could exercise jurisdiction over such counterclaim 
by virtue of a broad dispute settlement clause, nevertheless, the counterclaim was 
subsequently dismissed due to the lack of requisite connection.
182
  
Pointing to the lack of universal criteria of the test, the tribunal drew heavily 
from the reasoning of the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal in Westinghouse Electric 
Corp and American Bell and the ICSID contract-based tribunal in Klöckner.
183
 It 
explained that since the counterclaim reflected non-compliance with the general law of 
the Czech Republic and not the rights and obligations of the BIT, the legal link with 
Saluka’s primary claim was missing. According to the tribunal, disputes related to 
breaches of national laws in principle fall to be decided “through the appropriate 
procedures of Czech law”
184
 and not through the protection procedure under the BIT. 
As a consequence, such counterclaims cannot constitute an indivisible whole with 
investor’s primary claims under an IIA.
185
  
The decision has been approached with certain degree of criticism, rejecting the 
high threshold for legal connection set by the tribunal.
186
 In general, there are two weak 
                                                 
180
  Saluka v. Czech Republic, paras. 9-10. 
181
  The second counterclaim which arose under the share purchase agreement was dismissed because 
the parties to the agreement we not identical as the parties to the arbitration and the contract 
contained its own dispute settlement clause. See Saluka v. Czech Republic, paras. 49 and 56-58. 
182
  Saluka v. Czech Republic, paras. 39 and 81. 
183
  Saluka v. Czech Republic, paras. 65-69. 
184
  Saluka v. Czech Republic, para. 79. 
185
  Saluka v. Czech Republic, para. 79. 
186
  LALIVE, Pierre, HALONEN, Laura (2011). On the Availability of Counterclaims in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration. Czech Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2, p. 154. 
46 
 
points which deserve further comments. First, the requirement of legal symmetry does 
not respect the unique aspects of investment disputes under IIAs which only rarely 
provide for any obligations of investors upon which counterclaims could be based.
187
 In 
this regard, the insistence on the identity of legal sources and the function of operational 
unity is highly detrimental as it effectively excludes the admissibility of counterclaims 
where primary claims are derived from violations of an IIA.
188
 Second, the exclusive 
application of case law on contract-based counterclaims is misplaced due to different 
wording of arbitration rules. In relation to the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal, the 
Algiers Accords accepted only counterclaims arising “out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter”
189
 of the primary claim. 
By contrast, the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT contained a broad dispute settlement 
clause, referring to “all disputes […] concerning an investment”,
190
 without further 
restrictions as to the legal source. Since a host state may not often have any direct 
contractual relationship with an investor in a treaty-based arbitration, the limitation of 
counterclaims to those arising under an IIA creates an insurmountable obstacle.
191
 
Despite the deficient reasoning, the case Saluka v. Czech Republic was cited 
with approval in the UNCITRAL dispute Paushok v. Mongolia.
192
 The claimant, a 
Russian investor who owned gold mines, initiated arbitration due to Mongolia’s alleged 
breaches of the Mongolia-Russian Federation BIT by introducing a windfall profit tax 
and a fee on foreign workers.
193
 In response, Mongolia advanced seven counterclaims, 
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some of them on the grounds of general domestic law.
194
 The tribunal strictly adhered to 
the conclusions in Saluka v. Czech Republic and declared such counterclaims 
inadmissible, noting: 
All these issues squarely fall within the scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Mongolian courts and are governed by Mongolian public 
law, and cannot be considered as constituting an indivisible part of the 
Claimant’s claims based on the BIT and international law or as creating 




An alternative approach was adopted by the second category of tribunals which 
declared counterclaims of host states admissible for being heard on the merits. In Goetz 
v. Burundi, the investor claimed damages for alleged expropriatory measures against the 
African Bank of Commerce, in which it held shares, that ultimately led to the paralysis 
of the banking activities and culminated in the bank’s closure in 2000.
196
 Burundi 
submitted counterclaims on the basis that the African Bank of Commerce did not 
respect the conditions of its operating certificate and that its exercise of the free zone 
economic licence amounted to unfair competition.
197
 After asserting jurisdiction over 
Burundi’s counterclaims, the tribunal made the following observations: 
The main dispute relating to ABC concerned the lawfulness of the 
suspension of the free enterprise zone certificate and the resulting 
closure of the bank as a result of breaches of its obligations. The 
counterclaim relates to prejudice said to have been suffered by Burundi 
because of those same breaches. It therefore relates directly to the 
subject matter of the dispute, and it follows that is is admissible.
198
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As follows, in Goetz v. Burundi the tribunal departed from the reasoning of 
previous tribunals, finding as admissible counterclaims based on the violation of 
domestic law of Burundi while the investor’s primary claims arose out of breaches of 
the BIT.  
While the brevity of the decision on counterclaims in Goetz v. Burundi did not 
provide insight into the tribunal’s incentives for such departure, a more detailed 
explanation may be found in the recent award in Urbaser v. Argentina. The dispute 
arose out of the agreement on concession for water and sewerage services concluded 
between Argentina and a Spanish investor. Argentina advanced a counterclaim alleging 
that Urbaser failed to realize necessary investment, violating its obligations related to 
the human right to water.
199
 Interestingly, Argentina did not invoke provisions of its 
domestic law but relied on international human rights treaties, such as the ICESCR, 
instead.
200
 The tribunal first elaborated the factual link of Argentina’s counterclaim and 
concluded that similarly to the principal claims, it concerned the lack of sufficient 
investment in relation to the same concession.
201
 Having established the factual ties, it 
went on to analyse the legal connection, however, it did so in the light of the object of 
the primary claims, that is the Urbaser’s investment itself and its purpose. The tribunal 
explicitly noted that: 
[t]he legal connection is also established to the extent the Counterclaim 
is not alleged as a matter based on domestic law only. Respondent 
argues indeed that Claimants’ failure to provide the necessary 
investments caused a violation of the fundamental right for access to 
water, which was the very purpose of the investment agreed upon in the 
Regulatory Framework and the Concession Contract and embodied in 
the protection scheme of the BIT.
202
   
 To sum up, the tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina sidelined the requirement of 
legal symmetry and adopted a broader interpretation of the connexity test, lowering the 
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threshold for the admissibility of counterclaims in investment arbitration. While it still 
remains to be seen whether future tribunals will be willing to follow this path, the 
emphasis on the link between a counterclaim and an investment forming the object of 
the principal claim is advocated by numerous scholars. In their opinion, tribunals with a 
broad jurisdictional clause should be entitled to hear counterclaims, even where they do 
not arise out of the same legal source as primary claims.
203
 According to Lalive and 
Halonen, such modification of the connexity test is indispensable in light of the lack of 
rights and obligations of investors, be they individuals or private entities, under IIAs, or 
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5 CAUSES OF ACTION 
Since IIAs themselves rarely provide for obligations of investors, host states 
must seek alternative legal basis for their counterclaims in treaty-based investment 
arbitration. In principle, investors’ obligations are most often derived either from 
contracts or municipal law, however, both sources on their own encounter 
connectedness problems if the strict test proposed by Saluka v. Czech Republic is to be 
applied.  
As a result, it is crucial to identify provisions in IIAs which would either elevate 
purely contractual claims or claims for violations of domestic law to treaty claims or 
enable tribunals, at least, to consider these sources of obligations as law applicable to 
the dispute. While such effects can be easily attributed to some dispute settlement 
provisions, listing individual sources of obligations under which disputes may arise, the 
following analysis examines whether substantive provisions in IIAs may also operate in 
the same manner. 
 
5.1 Provisions requiring compliance with domestic laws of the host state 
In their introductory provisions, some IIAs may insist that an investment be 
made in compliance with the host state’s legislation.
205
 This requirement is most often 
incorporated directly in the definition of investment protected under the respective IIA. 
For instance, Article 1 of the Belarus-Yemen BIT provides that an investment means:  
every kind of assets invested by investors of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the laws 
and regulations of the latter. 
Since such wording restricts the host state’s offer to arbitrate so as to pertain only to 
protected investments under an IIA, investments made in violation of host state’s law 
                                                 
205
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will fall outside the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal.
206
 This conclusion was 
applied, for instance, in Fraport v. Philippines where the investor sought protection 
under the Germany-Philippines BIT, however, the tribunal dismissed its claims already 
at the jurisdictional stage due to the breaches of Philippine domestic law, limiting 




 The requirement of compliance with domestic laws and regulations is able to 
trigger the dismissal of investor’s claims in their entirety. It is disputable, however, 
whether it could serve as a cause of action for bringing a counterclaim. Most IIAs 
require that investors observe domestic law of the host state only at the moment when 
they make an investment in its territory.
208
 This implies that illegal conduct of an 
investor after the investment was admitted could be only a defense to claimed 
substantive violations of an IIA, but not a legal basis for the decline of jurisdiction of 
investor’s claims,
209
 let alone a cause of action for the filing of counterclaims.
210
  
 The same might not, however, necessarily apply to situations when these clauses 
are amended so as to cover not only the admission of investments but also their 
operation in the territory of a host state. While such provisions are still rare, they were 
integrated in numerous modern IIAs concluded in recent years. The requirement to 
                                                 
206
  DOUGLAS, Zachary (2014). The Plea of Illegality in Investment Treaty Arbitration. ICSID Review, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 155-156; MOLOO, Rahim, KHACHATURIAN, Alex (2011). The Compliance 
with the Law Requirement in International Investment Law. Fordham International Law Journal, 
Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 1474-1475. Identical reasoning was advocated, for example, by tribunals in the 
following cases: Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction,  
29 April 2004, para. 86; Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006, paras. 155, 252 and 258-264; Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, paras. 101-105; Quiborax SA and 
Non-Metallic Minerals SA v Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 27 September 2012, para. 266; Ambiente Ufficio SpA and others v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 8 February 2013, para. 517. 
207
  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Award, 16 August 2007, paras. 396-401 (“Fraport v. Philippines I”). 
208
  MOLOO, Rahim, KHACHATURIAN, Alex (2011). The Compliance with the Law Requirement in 
International Investment Law. Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 6, pp. 1474-1475. 
209
  Fraport v. Philippines I, para. 345; Hamester v. Ghana, para. 125. 
210
  This argument was explicitly raised in Urbaser v. Argentina where the tribunal agreed with the 
investor that the purpose of any references to domestic law within the definition of an investment is 
to determine the scope of application of the Argentina-Spain BIT, not to set obligations for investors 
to comply with host states’ legislation for the period of investment performance. See Urbaser  
v. Argentina, para. 1185. 
52 
 
comply with host state’s laws and regulations during the performance of an investment 
is, nevertheless, not part of its definition but forms a separate provision. A general rule 
of this kind is present, for example, in Article 13 of the COMESA Investment 
Agreement of 2007 which obliges investors as well as their investments to “comply with 
all applicable domestic measures of the Member State”. The treaty further provides that 
the term “measures” refers to “any legal, administrative, judicial or policy decision that 
is taken by a Member State”.
211
 Some IIAs further elaborate the requirement, citing 
specific areas of law as non-exhaustive examples. In this respect, Article 12 of the 
Ghana Model BIT of 2008 provides: 
Nationals and companies of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party shall be bound by the laws and regulations in 
force in the host State, including its laws and regulations on labour, 
health and the environment. 
In the light of these provisions, some scholars argue that the requirement to 
observe domestic law throughout the whole life-cycle of investment could increase the 
chances of host states to submit successful counterclaims in arbitral proceedings.
212
 
When such an obligation is incorporated into an IIA, host states would be able to satisfy 
more easily the connexity test for counterclaims arising out of domestic law.  
The scholars’ opinions were expressly confirmed in the case of Al Warraq v. 
Indonesia which was adjudicated under the OIC Treaty. Although the instrument was 
concluded already in 1981, the signatory states incorporated provisions rebalancing the 
asymmetry between the rights and obligations of investors. In this dispute, Mr. Al 
Warraq presented claims related to his criminal investigation by Indonesian authorities 
which was initiated in response to the allegations of misuse of bailout funds of an 
Indonesian bank into which he had invested.
213
 Indonesia, however, brought a 
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counterclaim, accusing Mr. Al Warraq of unjust enrichment by misusing the bank’s 
assets that had been entrusted to him.
214
  
Based on a broad dispute settlement clause, the tribunal upheld its jurisdiction 
and proceeded with the analysis of the treaty provisions to establish the source of 
investors’ obligations.
215
 It noted that Article 9 of the OIC Treaty required investors to 
abide by the laws and regulations of the host state, creating positive obligations for 
investors on the treaty level.
216
 For these reasons, the tribunal concluded: 
An investor of course has a general obligation to obey the law of the 
host state, but Article 9 raises this obligation from the plane of 
domestic law (and jurisdiction of domestic tribunals) to a treaty 
obligation binding on the investor in an investor state arbitration.
217
 
As the ruling in the case of Al Warraq v. Indonesia suggests, provisions 
requiring compliance with host states laws and regulations for the period of investment 
performance may potentially facilitate the filing of counterclaims, provided that the 
tribunals find jurisdiction. While such opportunity does not usually exist in the majority 
of IIAs, some modern IIAs appear to be more favourable to rebalancing the inequalities 
between host states and investors in international investment law. 
 
5.2 Provisions expressly incorporating investors’ obligations 
In contrast to narrow IIAs, some recent agreements or model treaties take the 
road of expanding ISDS by including specific obligations for investors, typically in the 
area of human rights, environment protection or labour law, as well as the right of host 
states to present counterclaims. In principle, it is accepted that these provisions directly 
regulate investors’ conduct on treaty level, therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether 
they could provide a legal basis for host state’s counterclaims in investment arbitration 
proceedings. There are three types of such provisions in current IIAs. 
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First, the intention to set out rules for investors’ behaviour may be reflected in 
the preamble of an IIA. While the preamble itself, unlike the substantive provisions, 
does not lay down any obligations, it serves as a context for the interpretation of the 
respective treaty.
218
 Indeed, this interpretative rule is enshrined not only in Article 31 of 
the VCLT but has been also widely accepted by arbitral tribunals.
219
 Its non-binding 




Second, some IIAs contain more sophisticated provisions which lay down the 
right of host states to regulate investors’ conduct in areas of public interest.
221
 The 
structure of such provisions is two-part. The introductory part acknowledged the fact 
that the encouragement of investments should not lead to the lowering of legal standards 
in the territories of host states. In this regard, the introduction is addressed to states and 
does not pose any limitations to investors as such. The following part of these 
provisions is an interpretative note to the respective treaty that entitles the parties to 
adopt or enforce any measures to maintain the legal standards in their territories. This 
approach is exemplified, for instance, in the United States-Uruguay BIT which draws 
upon the 2005 United States Model BIT. The treaty was designed to address host states’ 
concerns in the area of environmental protection and labour law. In this regard, Article 
12 of the United States-Uruguay BIT sets out: 
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1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic 
environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that 
it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or 
reduces the protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment 
in its territory. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such 
an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party 
and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement.  
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent 
with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
On plain reading, it is difficult to discern any concrete restrictions of investors’ 
conduct. By contrast, the language seems to be rather a confirmation of host states’ right 
to exercise their regulatory powers over investments in environment related matters. 
Although no tribunal has expressed an opinion on the effects of similar provisions, it is 
highly doubtful that they could result in an enforceable obligation on the part of 
investors. 
The prospects of filing successful counterclaims for breaches of obligations 
arising directly out of IIAs have emerged only in the context of recent model BITs. 
Unlike their predecessors, these BITs do not only affirm the host states’ authority to 
regulate investors’ conduct through their domestic law, but include concrete obligations 
without making further reference to other legal sources. The 2012 Model BIT of the 
SADC is an example of this trend. Besides a requirement to comply with domestic law 
of the host state for the whole period of investment life cycle, Part III of the treaty 
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contains a number of obligations for investors, including the prohibition of corruption or 
compliance with environmental, human rights and labour standards.
222
  
Equally, the 2015 Model BIT designed by India further contributes to the 
rebalancing of positions of host states and investors in investment arbitration by 
incorporating obligations related to transparency and taxation.
223
 While these IIAs could 
undoubtedly serve as causes of action for successful counterclaims, they have not yet 
been reflected in any BITs in force. For the time being, the IIAs as such are, therefore, 
deprived of practical utility for the assertion of counterclaims. 
 
5.3 Umbrella clauses 
Another source of obligations for investors which is frequently invoked by host 
states as the legal basis for their counterclaims are contracts concluded between an 
investor and a respondent state. In practice, investment contracts do not need to provide 
directly for investment arbitration as the dispute settlement mechanism. In such a case, 
contractual breaches may only benefit from the protection under an IIA where the treaty 
contains a specific provision elevating contractual breaches to treaty breaches.
224
 In 
principle, these provisions, commonly named umbrella clauses, oblige host states to 
observe any obligations which they had undertaken with respect to an investment.
225
 
Without going into a detailed discussion about the diverging views of proper effect of 
such clauses, these provisions serve as a treaty-based cause of action for investors to 
seek damages for contractual violations by a respondent state.
226
   
Standard umbrella clauses, however, do not have the same effect for the bringing 
of counterclaims in arbitral proceedings. In Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, Romania 
argued that its counterclaims fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction as the contractual 
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obligations under a privatization agreement became arbitrable by virtue of the umbrella 
clause in Article 2(6) of the Greece-Romania BIT.
227
 The tribunal did not agree with 
Romania, pointing to the language of the umbrella clause under which only host states 
committed themselves to comply with obligations they had entered into.
228
  
As follows, host states would be able to advance their contractual counterclaims 
where the wording of an umbrella clause would not be restricted only to the 
enforcement of their own obligations. In theory, such provisions are referred to as 
reverse umbrella clauses since they bind investors to observe their obligations towards 
the host state.
229
 To date, this type of umbrella clauses is not included in any IIA. On the 
other hand, their presence could arguably make little difference because the jurisdiction 
of an arbitral tribunal over a contract-based counterclaim might be precluded by an 
exclusive forum selection clause in the contract itself. 
 The fact that an investment contract provides for its own dispute settlement 
mechanism has been interpreted by numerous tribunals as an obstacle for the 
jurisdiction over or admissibility of contract-based claims submitted by investors. The 
rationale of this approach is the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the respect for the 
intention of contracting parties.
230
 Identical reasoning was expressly adopted also by 
tribunals dealing with contract-based counterclaims. In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the 
Czech Republic presented a counterclaim on the grounds of a share purchase agreement 
which contained its own mandatory arbitration provision. Citing the annulment decision 
in Vivendi v. Argentina, the tribunal concluded that the contract constituted a special 
agreement relating to Saluka’s investment and for these reasons, it superseded the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction in the proceedings.
231
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Uzbekistan requested the tribunal to adjudicate on counterclaims based on a special 
dividend agreement concluded between the Ministry of Finance of Uzbekistan and an 
Uzbek joint-stock company owned by the claimant. The tribunal found that 
Uzbekistan’s counterclaim was closely connected to claimant’s primary claims, 
however, it refused to exercise jurisdiction with reference to the express choice for 
dispute settlement by Uzbek courts in the contract.
232
     
 This reasoning has not been, nevertheless, accepted with unanimity.
233
 Lalive 
and Halonen suggest that the refusal to entertain similar counterclaims in arbitral 
proceedings contradicts the principle of fairness and procedural economy.
234
 As it was 
confirmed in SGS v. Pakistan, litigating related claims in two different fora would result 
in inequalities where investors are allowed to pursue their claims before investment 
tribunals while referring host states to domestic courts.
235
  
In conclusion, although there is no uniform interpretation of the effects of 
conflicting dispute resolution clauses in investment arbitration, it is arguable that future 
tribunals might find persuasive the reasoning applied in previous cases addressing 
contract-based counterclaims.
236
 It is, therefore, preferable for the successful bringing of 
such counterclaims that the underlying contracts do not comprise an exclusive forum 
selection clause.  
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5.4 Applicable law provisions 
Before the analysis of the merits of each case, tribunals are required to identify  
the law that will govern the resolution of the dispute at hand.
237
 In the light of the 
principle of party autonomy in investment arbitration, arbitrators’ inquiry is primarily 
focused on the provisions that contain an express choice of law as agreed by the state 
parties to the respective IIA.
238
 The problem arises where the IIA is silent on this issue 
and the arbitrators are obliged to find an implicit choice of law or otherwise fill the legal 
vacuum in accordance with the prohibition of non liquet.
239
 
In treaty-based investment arbitration, express applicable law provisions were 
examined in two cases to find the legal basis of host state’s counterclaims that could 
serve as a proper cause of action. The decisions of both tribunals are eloquent of the 
influence that the wording of such clauses might have on the successful assertion of 
counterclaims in arbitral proceedings. In Amto v. Ukraine, the investor advanced claims 
for breaches of the ECT in connection with the winding up of a state-owned nuclear 
power plant, accusing the debtor, a state-owned company Energoatom, of collusion with 
one of the creditors, DonetskOblEnergo. In response to these allegations, Ukraine filed 
a counterclaim for non-material injury to its reputation.
240
 Without discussing the 
jurisdiction separately, the tribunal dismissed Ukraine’s counterclaim, making a 
reference to the applicable law under the ECT: 
Article 26(6) ЕСТ provides that the applicable law to an ЕСТ dispute is 
the Treaty itself and ‘the applicable rules and principles of international 
law’. The Respondent has not presented any basis in this applicable law 
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for a claim of nonmaterial injury to reputation based on the allegations 
made before an Arbitral Tribunal.
241
 
In this regard, the award in Amto v. Ukraine exemplifies how restrictive 
language of applicable law provisions may limit the host state’s chances to entertain 
counterclaims in investment arbitration. On the other hand, many IIAs offer wider range 
of legal sources to be applied to the disputes arising under the respective treaty, without 
prescribing their strict hierarchy.
242
 Apart from the rules in the treaty itself, the tribunals 
are usually allowed to consider other sources of international law, general principles of 




A broader applicable law clause was invoked as the legal basis for a 
counterclaim in the recent dispute of Urbaser v. Argentina related to investors’ 
obligations under the concession contract for water and sewerage services in the 
Province of Greater Buenos Aires. In this case, Argentina presented a counterclaim, 
alleging that by failing to make the agreed investments, investors breached the principle 
of good faith and pacta sunt servanda under both Argentine and international law and, 
at the same time, violated international human rights obligation, namely the right to 
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 The tribunal rejected claimants’ argument that the Argentina-
Spain BIT had to be examined as a stand-alone agreement, pointing to Article X(5) of 
the BIT which lists general principles of international law as well as other treaties 
concluded by Argentina and Spain as the law applicable to the dispute.
245
 In light of the 
interpretation rules enshrined in the VCLT, the tribunal emphasized that every treaty 
provision had to be construed “in respect of its purpose as a rule with an effective 
meaning” and concluded that international law, cited in Article X(5) of the BIT, as such 
could form a valid legal basis of Argentina’s counterclaim.
246
 
As follows, explicit choice of law in IIAs may increase host state’s chance to 
assert successful counterclaims in arbitral proceedings, particularly when it refers to a 
number of legal sources, such as international law, national law of host states or general 
legal principles. By contrast, restrictive language of these clauses may be fatal to the 
bringing of counterclaims other than those based on the IIA itself or international law.  
In conclusion, the remaining question concerns the legal basis of counterclaims 
in the absence of an express provision on applicable law. In the context of investment 
treaty arbitration, the selected arbitration rules provide further guidance on this issue, 
albeit rather general. Although the respective rules are drafted in a very different 
manner, they all leave the tribunals with a wide discretion on the choice of law to the 
merits of the disputes.
247
 In other words, the tribunals would be allowed to apply both 
international law as well as domestic law of host states.
248
 Therefore, the missing choice 
of law in an IIA might not have a restrictive effect on the legal basis of counterclaims 
upon which they can be raised.
249
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While counterclaims may, to certain degree, redress the illegal conduct  
of investors in the territory of host states, including the violations of human rights,  
the current legal regime poses many obstacles to their successful assertion in the arbitral 
proceedings. The majority of IIAs which are presently in force do not provide for 
obligations of investors for the period of investment performance directly on treaty level 
or the bringing of counterclaims as such. In this regard, host states are in the position of 
perpetual respondents who must find alternative ways of enforcing the compliance with 
their laws and regulations or binding rules of international law by investors. 
These imbalances are being increasingly addressed in the modern IIAs that could 
enable host states to adopt an offensive tactics in the proceedings and preserve their 
public interests in a more efficient manner. Renegotiation of international treaties, is 
however, a complicated process which is highly dependent on the political will of 
individual states. For these reasons, the aim of this paper was to analyse the wording of 
existing IIAs and the practice of investment tribunals to infer whether host states are 
able to advance successful counterclaims under the current state of international 
investment law.  
Unlike in contract-based arbitration, host states face numerous obstacles both on 
procedural and substantive grounds when they bring counterclaims before tribunals 
established under IIAs. In this context, tribunals are only able to hear counterclaims if 
the issues of jurisdiction, admissibility and cause of action are successfully resolved. In 
Chapter 1, this paper poses three research questions to deal with each of these issues 
separately. Based on the analysis of available arbitral awards which provide reasoning 
on the filing of counterclaims by host states in investment arbitration, the following 
conclusions can be formulated.  
 
Research question 1: What is the required wording of dispute settlement clauses in IIAs 
permitting arbitral tribunals to establish their jurisdiction over counterclaims? 
 In treaty-based arbitration, the consent is the cornerstone for the course of the 
whole proceedings. Unlike in arbitrations initiated on the grounds of an investment 
contract concluded between an investor and a host state, the consent to arbitrate a 
dispute under an IIA is perfected in two steps. First, host states make their offer to 
arbitrate in an international treaty, delimiting the scope of disputes to be resolved by 
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investment tribunals. Second, this offer must be accepted by individual investors, 
usually by filing a request to arbitrate a specific dispute which arose in relation to 
alleged breaches of such treaty.  
 Before the tribunals may turn to the examination of the merits of counterclaims, 
they must first establish that the counterclaims fall within the scope of consent 
expressed in the IIA. According to the case law, tribunals primarily determined their 
jurisdiction over counterclaims in the light of the scope of arbitrable disputes, 
irrespective of the limitations on the locus standi under the IIAs. With regard to 
jurisdiction ratione materiae, tribunals dismissed counterclaims where the dispute 
settlement provisions were restricted to disputes arising only out of violations of host 
states’ obligations. By contrast, jurisdiction was unanimously accepted in cases where 
the IIAs in question provided for the settlement of “all” or “any” disputes, despite the 
narrow wording concerning the right to submit disputes for resolution. Finally, the 
doctrine suggests that counterclaims would fall within the tribunals’ jurisdiction where 
the consent to arbitrate covers disputes under listed legal sources. Although no tribunal 
has yet interpreted such clauses, this conclusion is acceptable due to their broad 
formulation which would have also a significant impact on the causes of action to be 
invoked by host states as a legal basis for their counterclaims.     
 
Research question 2: How should arbitral tribunals interpret the requirement of legal 
and factual connection between a primary claim and a counterclaim? 
 Unlike the issue of jurisdiction which is to be strictly governed by the language 
of individual IIAs, the question of admissibility of counterclaims is left to the 
interpretation of arbitral tribunals. The condition of close factual and legal connection is 
applied in various forms both by national and international courts or tribunals. With 
respect to investment arbitration, the first tribunals seised with host states’ 
counterclaims drew inspiration from the case law of the ICJ and the Iran/United States 
Claims Tribunal which required that presented counterclaims arise out of the same 
factual matrix and the same legal source, be it an international treaty, customary 
international law or a contract.  
In the context of treaty-based investment arbitration, the application of this strict 
test for the legal link between a primary claim and a counterclaim, however, resulted in 
the dismissal of the latter due to the differences in their legal basis. The lack of legal 
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symmetry is yet inherent to disputes arising under an IIA which rarely contains any 
obligations for investors, making the host states obliged to seek alternative sources of 
obligations, such as national law, general legal principles or contracts.  
In view of the specific features of treaty-based arbitration, some tribunals 
applied a modified test examining the link between a counterclaim and an investment 
forming the object of the principal claim. This is both a factual and a legal inquiry 
because the term “investment” is a legal concept defined in every IIA. Indeed, the focus 
on the investment rather than on the identity of legal sources better reflects the nature of 
treaty-based arbitration where investors and host states do not have to be in any direct 
legal relationship with each other. 
 
Research question 3: Which provisions in IIAs could enable host states to invoke 
substantive obligations of investors under various legal sources?   
The issue of causes of action forming the legal basis of counterclaims is heavily 
dependent on the form of the connexity test applied by the arbitral tribunal. Should a 
tribunal follow the requirement of legal symmetry, a counterclaim will be successful 
only if the host state can rely on the same legal basis out of which investor’s claims 
arise. In other words, where an investor seeks damages for the breaches of an IIA, a host 
state could successfully advance only counterclaims with the same legal basis. As 
follows from the analysis, such counterclaims could rely on numerous provisions: 
clauses requiring the compliance with domestic laws and regulations for the period of 
investment performance, reverse umbrella clauses or provisions directly incorporating 
investors’ obligations on treaty level. These provisions are, nevertheless, present mostly 
in modern IIAs and constitute, therefore, rather exceptions in the context of current 
international investment law. 
On the contrary, such restrictions would not apply if a tribunal adopts a modified 
connexity test requiring a link between a counterclaim and an investment as defined 
under an IIA. Under these circumstances, host states would not have to rely only on the 
respective IIA but could also invoke other sources of obligations, such as contracts, 
domestic law or other international treaties, provided that these sources were connected 
to the disputed investment and formed applicable law in the dispute. Put differently, in 
such cases the successful assertion of counterclaims would be subject only to the scope 
of applicable law provisions. 
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 As for future research, this paper has not addressed all issues related to the 
bringing of counterclaims for violations of human rights by investors. In the light of the 
recent award in Urbaser v. Argentina, many questions emerge with regard to the type of 
human rights obligations which can be attributed to investors as private entities in the 
context of public international law or the damages to be awarded for their breaches as 
well as their distribution to the victims. Since none of these questions has been 
extensively examined by arbitral tribunals, the value of such research will depend on the 
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Mezinárodní investiční arbitráž je dlouhodobě kritizována za svou strukturální 
předpojatost vůči hostitelským státům ve prospěch ochrany zájmů investorů. 
Jednostranná povaha tohoto způsobu řešení sporů byla v nedávné době nicméně 
zpochybněna řadou případů, v nichž se rozhodci zabývali protinároky hostitelských 
států na odškodnění za nezákonné chování investorů. 
Za účelem úspěšného uplatnění svých protinároků v rozhodčím řízení se však 
musí hostitelské státy vypořádat s četnými překážkami. Předložení sporu rozhodčímu 
tribunálu je v první řadě závislé na souhlasu jak ze strany investora, tak ze strany 
hostitelského státu. Rozsah tohoto souhlasu je přitom dán zněním rozhodčích doložek 
v dvoustranných dohodách o ochraně investic či mnohostranných smlouvách. Zatímco 
tyto instrumenty všeobecně umožňují investorům vznést širokou škálu nároků týkajících 
se jejich investic, protinároky hostitelských států spadají do pravomoci rozhodčích 
tribunálů pouze v případě, že příslušné dvoustranné dohody či mnohostranné smlouvy 
obsahují zároveň široce formulovanou rozhodčí doložku. 
Druhou podmínkou, která se již týká přípustnosti samotných protinároků 
hostitelských států, je jejich úzká souvislost s nároky vznesenými investory. Tento 
požadavek je v různé formě prosazován nejen národními, ale také mezinárodními soudy 
a tribunály za účelem zajištění efektivity a hospodárnosti řízení. Ačkoliv se některé 
rozhodčí tribunály výrazně inspirovaly judikaturou související se spory vznikajícími na 
základě investičních dohod, tento přístup neodráží specifický charakter investiční 
arbitráže založené na dvoustranných dohodách o ochraně investic či mnohostranných 
smlouvách, kdy mezi investory a hostitelskými státy nemusí existovat žádný přímý 
smluvní vztah. Z těchto důvodů by měly rozhodčí tribunály ke zjištění faktické a právní 
souvislosti mezi protinároky hostitelských států a nároky investorů používat 
modifikovaný test. 
Vzhledem k tomu, že dvoustranné dohody o ochraně investic či mnohostranné 
smlouvy jen zřídka obsahují povinnosti přímo pro investory, hostitelské státy musí často 
odkazovat na jiné prameny, jako je národní právo nebo investiční dohody uzavřené 
mezi investorem a hostitelským státem. Rozhodčí tribunály ve své analýze přitom 
podobné protinároky často zamítaly, protože tyto alternativní zdroje povinností pro 
investory nemohly aplikovat. Zatímco v případě široce formulovaných rozhodčích 
doložek nejsou pochybnosti, že mohou rozhodčím tribunálům tuto pravomoc 
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poskytnout, nedávná rozhodnutí rozhodčích tribunálů ukazují, že podobné účinky 
mohou mít i některá hmotněprávní ustanovení dvoustranných dohod o ochraně investic 
či mnohostranných smluv. 
 
KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA 




International investment arbitration has been long criticized for its structural bias 
against host states in favour of the defence of the interests of investors. The one-way 
character of this dispute settlement mechanism has been, however, recently challenged 
in the light of numerous cases in which arbitrators were confronted with counterclaims 
of host states, requesting damages for investors’ illegal conduct.  
To successfully assert counterclaims in arbitral proceedings, host states have to 
deal with a series of difficulties. The submission of a dispute to an arbitral tribunal first 
requires consent both on the part of an investor and a host state. Its scope is determined 
by the language of dispute settlement provisions in international investment agreements. 
While these instruments generally accept a wide range of investors’ claims related to 
their investments, counterclaims of host states fall within the jurisdiction of tribunals 
only if the international investment agreements contain a dispute settlement clause with 
broad wording. 
The second condition which concerns the admissibility of host states’ 
counterclaims is their close connection with the primary claims advanced by investors. 
This requirement has been in various forms applied not only by national but also 
international courts or tribunals to ensure efficiency and procedural economy at the 
same time. While some investment tribunals heavily drew upon the case law related to 
contract-based disputes, this approach does not reflect the specific nature of treaty-
based investment arbitration where investors and host states do not have to enter into 
any direct contractual relationship. For these reasons, the tribunals should adopt a 
modified test to find the requisite factual and legal connection between host states’ 
counterclaims and investors’ primary claims. 
 Finally, since international investment agreements themselves rarely provide for 
obligations of investors, host states must often refer to other sources, such as their 
domestic law or contracts concluded between an investor and a host state. In their 
analyses, arbitral tribunals frequently dismissed counterclaims due to their inability to 
apply these alternative sources of obligations for investors. While there are little doubts 
that broad dispute settlement provisions may provide tribunals with such competence, 
recent case law of investment tribunals has pointed out that some substantive provisions 
in international investment agreements may have the same effect. 
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